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Abstract
In the past, foreign borrowing by developing countries was comprised almost en-
tirely of government borrowing. Recently, private rms and individuals in developing
countries borrow substantially from foreign lenders. It is not clear whether the observed
increase in private sector borrowing leads to overborrowing and frequent defaults by
governments in developing countries. In this paper, we develop a tractable quantitative
model in which private agents decide how much to borrow but the government decides
whether to default. The model with decentralized borrowing increases aggregate credit
costs and sovereign default risk, and reduces aggregate welfare, relative to a model with
centralized borrowing. Private agents do not internalize the eect of their borrowing
on economy-wide credit costs and thus would like to borrow more than the socially
ecient level. Depending on the severity of default penalties, decentralized borrowing
may lead to either too much or too little debt in equilibrium. The introduction of
decentralized borrowing substantially improves the model's empirical t in terms of
matching observed debt levels and default rates.
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In the past, foreign borrowing by developing countries was comprised almost entirely of
government borrowing. Recently, owing in part to eorts by international institutions to
promote economic growth, private rms and individuals in developing countries borrow sub-
stantially from foreign lenders. As shown in Figure 1, private borrowing rose from only 18
percent of total borrowing from foreign lenders in 1990 to more than 70 percent in 2008.1
Foreign lenders often price private loans with macroeconomic indicators of developing coun-
tries instead of characteristics of private borrowers, because governments can block private
debt repayments or nationalize private debts if such an action is perceived as welfare im-
proving.2 The surge in private borrowing and the lending practices of foreign lenders have
been blamed for causing overborrowing and frequent defaults by developing countries.




































This paper investigates the eect of decentralized borrowing in a tractable quantita-
tive model in which private agents decide how much to borrow but the government decides
whether to default. We have three main ndings. First, the model with decentralized bor-
rowing increases aggregate credit costs and sovereign default risk, and reduces aggregate
welfare, relative to the model with centralized borrowing where the government also decides
how much to borrow. Second, depending on the severity of default penalties, decentralized
borrowing may lead to either too much or too little debt in equilibrium. Third, the intro-
duction of decentralized borrowing substantially improves the model's empirical t in terms
of matching observed debt levels and default rates.
1Data come from Global Development Finance.
2Chile's debt nationalization in 1982 is an example. For more detailed discussion, see Fernandez-Arias
and Lombardo (1998) and Ferri et al. (1999).
1Our model extends the classic centralized-borrowing framework of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) by decentralizing borrowing decisions. A continuum of identical households borrow
from foreign lenders in terms of non-contingent debt to smooth their aggregate income shocks.
A benevolent government decides on whether to enforce debt repayments to maximize the
welfare of the representative household. If the government defaults, the country loses access
to international nancial markets and suers from income losses for some stochastic periods.
Foreign lenders oer the households a bond price schedule which depends on the level of
aggregate borrowing instead of individual borrowing, because aggregate borrowing, together
with the aggregate income shock, determines the default probability. Our centralized default
setup captures the lending practices to developing countries based on aggregate indicators.3
We rst contrast the model mechanisms determining the equilibrium level of debt under
decentralized borrowing with those under centralized borrowing. Under centralized borrow-
ing, the government takes into account the adverse eect of an extra unit of debt on credit
costs and on next-period default probabilities when choosing debt contracts. In contrast,
individual households fail to internalize the adverse eect of their borrowing on aggregate
credit costs and next-period default probabilities, and would like to overborrow. The over-
borrowing incentive lowers the repayment welfare and thus increases the default likelihood
of the government. Consequently, the bond price schedule is lower under decentralized bor-
rowing, which tends to reduce the debt level. The relative strength of the overborrowing
incentive and the bond price schedule eect determines the equilibrium level of debt.
To examine quantitative implications of decentralized borrowing, we then parameterize
the model, in particular, the default penalties. Following Arellano (2008), we assume that
income losses after default are disproportionately large under good income shocks, allowing
the default model to generate the empirically reasonable default rate. Under the benchmark
parameter values, we nd that decentralized borrowing substantially increases credit costs,
the default rate and the equilibrium level of debt, and reduces the country's welfare relative
to centralized borrowing. All these implications except the one on the equilibrium level of
debt are robust to alternative parameter values of default penalties.
Decentralized borrowing increases the equilibrium level of debt under lenient default
penalties, but lowers it under severe default penalties, relative to centralized borrowing.4
Consider the two eects determining the equilibrium level of debt. The overborrowing incen-
3In our model, decentralized borrowing and decentralized default generate the same outcomes as central-
ized borrowing and centralized default.
4If income losses after default are a constant fraction of the income shock, the decentralized borrowing
model always generates underborrowing in equilibrium. For details see section 4.2.
2tive arises from the failure of individual households to internalize the eect of their borrowing
on the bond price. Thus, the overborrowing incentive is strong when the bond price declines
rapidly with debt, i.e., when default penalties are lenient. The bond price schedule eect
arises from the failure of individual households to internalize the eect of their borrowing on
the government's default choices. Thus, the bond price schedule eect is strong when the
government wants to avoid default badly, i.e., when default penalties are severe. Therefore,
when default penalties are lenient, the overborrowing eect dominates, implying equilibrium
overborrowing. When default penalties are severe, the bond price schedule eect dominates,
implying equilibrium underborrowing.
Decentralized borrowing improves the model's empirical t in many dimensions. In par-
ticular, decentralized borrowing has an inherent mechanism to simultaneously increase both
the debt level and the default rate in equilibrium. Individual households tend to borrow reck-
lessly due to the failure to internalize the adverse eect of their borrowing, and consequently
the government nds default attractive more often. In contrast, the model with centralized
borrowing can improve one dimension of the model t at the expense of the other. When
both models are calibrated to match the observed default rate, the centralized borrowing
model generates an extremely low debt to income ratio of 5%, but this ratio is 17% under
the decentralized borrowing model.
Our work is closely related to Uribe (2006), who shows that regardless of whether a debt
limit is imposed at the country level or at the individual level, the equilibrium level of debt
is the same. In his analysis, the debt limit and the interest rate are exogenously specied,
and there is no default risk. By contrast, in our model, the presence of default risk endoge-
nizes both the interest rate and the debt limit. In particular, the overborrowing incentive of
individual agents drives up sovereign default risk and the interest rate. Consequently, decen-
tralized borrowing generates an equilibrium level of debt dierent from centralized borrowing
in general.
Our work is related to the recent theoretical literature on private international borrow-
ing. Jeske (2006) and Wright (2006) study the eect of private borrowing under complete
markets, where no default occurs in equilibrium. In contrast, we consider an incomplete
markets environment5 and allow equilibrium default. Broner and Ventura (2010) analyze an
environment with both domestic and international trade of contingent claims among private
agents. They assume that the government, when deciding whether to enforce the claims,
5Bai and Zhang (2010) show that both incomplete markets and default risk are important to account for
various dimensions of international data, for example, savings and investment behavior.
3cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors. We implicitly allow discrimi-
nation; the government always enforces repayments among domestic agents but can choose
not to enforce repayments to foreigners.
Our model builds on the classic sovereign default framework of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and recent quantitative research on sovereign debt. Arellano (2008), Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006), Bai and Zhang (2009), Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) and Yue (2009) assume
that the government makes both borrowing and default decisions. Mendoza and Yue (2008),
on the other hand, allow private rms to borrow abroad to nance their working capital and
a government to borrow on behalf of households, while the default decision is made by the
government. Their focus is dierent from ours: they aim to generate endogenous output
costs of default.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model with
decentralized borrowing. In section 3, we compare the quantitative implications of the
models with decentralized and centralized borrowing. Section 4 investigates how dierent
default penalties aect the quantitative results, in particular, the equilibrium debt level. We
conclude in section 5.
2 Models
This section presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of decentralized bor-
rowing and centralized default in which borrowing decisions are made by individual house-
holds and default decisions are made by a government. This setup is intended to capture an
environment in which borrowing decisions are made by private agents and lending decisions
of foreign lenders are guided by aggregate indicators rather than individual borrowers' ability
to repay.
2.1 Model with Decentralized Borrowing
The model economy consists of three types of agents: a continuum of identical households
and a sovereign government in a small open economy, and foreign lenders. The households re-
ceive stochastic aggregate income shocks y, which follow a Markov process with the transition
function f(y0;y). In order to smooth income shocks, the households trade non-contingent
bonds b with risk-neutral foreign lenders. The benevolent government, maximizing its rep-
resentative household's welfare, decides whether to enforce foreign debt contracts. In each
4period, the country is either in the normal phase with access to international nancial mar-
kets or in the penalty phase without access to nancial markets.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of each period, the income shock y is realized. If
the country is in the normal phase, the government decides whether to enforce the repayment
of outstanding foreign debt B.6 If the government enforces debt contracts, the households
repay their debt b and decide on consumption c and next-period debt b0. If the government
defaults, the households do not to repay their debt, and the economy goes into the penalty
phase. The country in the penalty phase suers from income loss and has probability  of
reverting to the normal phase each period.
Government
At the beginning of the normal period, the benevolent government observes current income
shock y and aggregate foreign debt B. The government decides whether to enforce debt
contracts to maximize the representative household's welfare. This welfare is given by vD(y)
if the government chooses to default, and vR(B;y; (B;y)) if the government chooses to
enforce the repayment with an anticipation that the economy will borrow B0 =  (B;y) this
period. Thus, the government solves the following problem:
D(B;y) = arg max
d2f0;1g






where d = 1 indicates default and d = 0 indicates repayment. If the repayment welfare
vR is greater than the default welfare vD, then the government enforces the repayment of
individual debt contracts. Otherwise, the government decides to declare default.
Foreign Lenders
Foreign lenders are risk neutral. They operate in competitive international nancial markets
and have the opportunity cost of funds at the risk-free interest rate r. They thus have to
break even for each debt contract. Since the government's default decisions are based on
aggregate debt, the bond price schedule also depends on aggregate debt. For any aggregate
borrowing level B0, the lender expects to receive the repayment B0 next period if and only
if the government enforces repayment next period, that is D(B0;y0) = 0. Thus, the total
expected repayment next period is
R
y0 B0 (1   D(B0;y0))f(y0;y)dy0. The resource cost of this
debt contract to the lender today is q(B0;y)B0. The zero prot condition requires that the
6A positive B denotes foreign assets, and a negative B denotes foreign debt.





y0 (1   D(B0;y0))f(y0;y)dy0
1 + r
: (2)
If the government will enforce repayment under all future income shocks, the bond price is
simply the inverse of the gross risk-free rate. However, if the government defaults for some
future income shocks, the bond price is lower to compensate for the default risk.
Individual Households
We now describe the individual household's problem. A measure one continuum of innitely-
lived identical households have ow utility u(c) over consumption c, where u() is increasing
and strictly concave. If the country is in the normal phase and the government decides to
repay, then the households can trade one-period non-contingent bonds b0. The households
take as given the aggregate borrowing level B0 and the associated bond price q(B0;y). In
addition, the households also take as given the default decision of the government D(B0;y0).






























where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor, and B00 =  (B0;y0) is aggregate bonds that the
economy will issue next period if the government continues to enforce repayment. Aggregate
borrowing B0 plays an important role in each household's decision; it pins down the cost
of borrowing today, the government's default decision next period, and future aggregate
borrowing B00.
If the government decides to default, the households do not repay their debt but lose
access to international nancial markets. In each period, the economy has probability  of
regaining access to international nancial markets with zero debt obligations. During the
exclusion periods, the households suer from income loss; their income drops from y to ydef.





















The recursive competitive equilibrium of this economy is a list of (i) individual value functions
and policy functions: vR, vD, c, and b0, (ii) a government default decision function D(B;y),
(iii) an actual law of motion for aggregate debt B0 =  (B;y), and (iv) a bond price schedule
q(B0;y) such that
1. Given q;  and D, the value and policy functions solve the household's problem.
2. The household's policy function b0 is consistent with  .
3. Given  , D(B;y) solves the government's problem.
4. The bond price schedule q(B0;y) ensures foreign lenders' break-even in expected value.
2.2 Model with Centralized Borrowing
We compare our decentralized borrowing model with the standard Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) type model of centralized borrowing. All aspects of the model with centralized bor-
rowing are identical to the model with decentralized borrowing, except one dierence. In the
centralized borrowing model, the government, instead of the households, makes the borrow-










where W R(B;y) is the repayment welfare and W D(y) is the default welfare. Let DC(B;y)
denote the government optimal default decision and qC(B0;y) denote the bond price schedule.
The repayment welfare is given by
W
R(B;y) = max










Note that the government chooses aggregate debt next-period, B0, and allocates it evenly



















y0 (1   DC(B0;y0))f(y0;y)dy0
1 + r
: (8)
7One can also think of the government's problem as the representative household's problem.
7The recursive competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of a list of the govern-
ment's value functions, fW;W R;W Dg, policy functions fB0; DCg and a bond price schedule
qC(B0;y) such that
1. Under qC, the value and policy functions solve the government's problem.
2. The bond price qC(B0;y) ensures foreign lenders' break-even in expected value.
2.3 Comparison of the Two Borrowing Environments
In order to facilitate exposition, we treat the value functions and the bond price functions























@B0 B0 term represents the change in the bond price in response to one extra unit of














since households take the bond price as given.
For expository purposes, let us compare the debt levels assuming that the bond price
schedules and the default sets are the same in the two models, that is qC = q and DC = D.
Denote the optimal bond holdings in the model with centralized borrowing and in the model
with decentralized borrowing by B0
C and B0
D, respectively.9 For suciently low levels of debt,
the government enforces repayments under all future shocks and thus the economy faces the
risk-free interest rate. We denote the maximum amount of such debt by B
0
and refer to it as
the safe debt limit. Then it must be the case that
@q(B0;y)





D if the optimal debt is below the safe debt limit in both models.
Now consider the eect of raising debt by one unit when B0 < B
0
. The marginal cost
is the expected loss in future utility conditional on not defaulting next period, which is the
8The solution method employed in the quantitative analysis section does not depend on the dierentia-
bility of the value functions and the bond price schedule.
9With decentralized borrowing, individual households choose b0
D instead of B0
D. In equilibrium, however,
individual and aggregate debt coincide. Thus, we compare aggregate debt in the two models.
8right hand side of equation (9) and (10). The marginal benet is the current utility gain
from the resource raised by one extra unit of debt, which is the left hand side of these two
equations. We plot the marginal cost and benet for each model in Figure 2. The marginal
costs are identical across the two models and rise with the debt level B0. The marginal
benets in both models decline with the debt level B0. Moreover, the marginal benet is
higher under decentralized borrowing, since
@q(B0;y)
@B0 > 0 and
B0@q(B0;y)
@B0 < 0. At the optimal
debt level, the marginal benet equals the marginal cost. This implies that B0
C > B0
D, and
so the households would like to borrow more under decentralized borrowing.
Figure 2: Marginal Benet and Cost of Debt
Marginal Cost
B’






When making borrowing decisions, the government internalizes the adverse eect of ad-
ditional borrowing on the bond price, but individual households, acting as price takers, do
not. This is an example of a pecuniary externality: one individual's actions aect another
individual's welfare through prices.10 Pecuniary externalities by themselves are not a source
of ineciency since they work within the market mechanism through prices. However, they
do cause eciency losses and lower welfare if there are other market imperfections such as
incomplete markets and limited enforcement in the model.11
The above discussions assume that the bond price and default schedules are the same in
the two models. These assumptions automatically hold if default never occurs in equilibrium
and the bond price schedule is an exogenous function of aggregate debt. In this case, decen-
10Levchenko (2005) highlights another source of externality of private borrowing. When there are het-
erogeneous agents and heterogeneous access to international nancial markets, nancial integration might
break domestic risk sharing and hurt those without access to international nancial markets.
11For more discussions on eciency losses from pecuniary externalities, see Loong and Zeckhauser (1982)
and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
9tralized borrowing unambiguously leads to overborrowing in equilibrium.12 However, in our
model both the bond price and default schedules are endogenous. Given the overborrowing
incentives of the households, borrowing costs are higher and welfare, especially the repay-
ment welfare, is lower under decentralized borrowing. Consequently, the government has a
higher incentive to default, and the bond price schedule is less favorable under decentral-
ized borrowing, i.e., the default set changes and the bond price schedule shifts. This bond
price schedule eect reduces borrowing. Hence, whether decentralized borrowing leads to
equilibrium overborrowing depends on which eect dominates: the overborrowing incentive
or the bond price schedule eect. We analyze quantitatively the impacts of decentralized
borrowing on the equilibrium debt level in the next section.
3 Quantitative Analysis
This section investigates the quantitative implications of the decentralized borrowing model.
In order to highlight the impacts of decentralized borrowing, we rst compare the equilibrium
dynamics of the decentralized and centralized borrowing environments. We then evaluate
the ability of the decentralized borrowing model to account for observed statistical moments
of the business cycle in Argentina.
3.1 Calibration and Computation
We calibrate the model at the quarterly frequency. The utility has standard CRRA form:
u(c) = c1 s 1
1 s , where the coecient of relative risk aversion s is 2. The risk-free interest
rate is set to 1.7%, corresponding to the average quarterly interest rate of a ve-year U.S.
treasury bond for the period 1983{2001. The income shock yt follows an AR(1) process:
ln(yt) = ln(yt 1)+"t with jj < 1 and "t  N(0;2
"). We use the time series of Argentina's
GDP to calibrate the shock process and estimate  to be 0.945 and " to be 0:025.
The default penalty plays a crucial role in sovereign debt models. In the benchmark
calibration, we assume that the default penalty is disproportionately large for large income




(1   ) y if y > (1   ) y
y if y  (1   ) y ; (11)
where  y denotes the unconditional mean of income shocks, and  characterizes the income
loss after default. A larger  makes the default penalty more severe both by lowering the
12This is one of the examples in Uribe (2006) and referred to as the debt-elastic country premium case.
10threshold income shock that is subject to income loss and by raising the magnitude of
income loss. We refer to this specication as the asymmetric default penalty. An alternative
specication is the symmetric default penalty where income loss is a constant fraction of
the income shock. We conduct the sensitivity analysis on the default penalties in the next
section.
The empirical motivation for the asymmetric default penalty is that sovereign default is
often accompanied by a drop in private credit, and so the economy would have to forgo larger
income under good shocks.13 The technical motivation is that with a symmetric default
penalty, sovereign debt models rarely generate equilibrium default and fail to match the
default rate observed in the data. The asymmetric default penalty makes default attractive
when the country experiences bad shocks, and thus helps raise the default probability.
The default penalty parameter , the discount factor , and the re-entry probability
 are chosen such that the model with decentralized borrowing produces the 3% default
probability, 14% income drop upon default, and 1.75% standard deviation of the trade
balance observed in the Argentina data. The default penalty parameter  is estimated to
be 0:08 and the discount factor  is 0:97. The re-entry probability  is estimated to be
0.1, which corresponds to 10 quarters of exclusion from international nancial markets after
default. This is in line with the historical evidence presented in Gelos et al. (2008).14 See
the lower panel of Table 1 for the summary of these parameter values.
With the functional forms and parameters described above, we solve the models nu-
merically. The shock is discretized into a 21-state Markov chain using a quadrature based
method of Tauchen and Hussey (1991). Hatchondo et al. (2008) show that the discrete state-
space technique (DSS) is likely to introduce spurious interest rate movements and amplify
the volatility and countercyclicality of the interest rate. To address this concern, we aug-
ment the DSS method by interpolating the bond price schedule. The detailed interpolation
algorithm and the eect of the interpolation are presented in Appendix A.
After solving the model, we simulate the model for 500,000 periods and nd the latest
1,000 default episodes. We extract 74 consecutive observations of the normal period before
each default event and examine the mean statistics over these samples. The 74 observations
prior to a default episode correspond to the number of quarters between the latest two
default events in Argentina.15 In the next subsection, we compare the implications of the
13Mendoza and Yue (2008) present a model that generates endogenously this form of income loss.
14Gelos et al. (2008) nd, for all defaulting episodes during the period of 1980{2000, that the median
exclusion length is 3 years after default.
15In the model with centralized borrowing, default is so rare that only 53 samples satisfy our criteria. We
11decentralized borrowing model with those of the centralized borrowing model.
3.2 Decentralized versus Centralized Borrowing
Table 1 presents statistics for the Argentina data and for the decentralized and centralized
borrowing models. The rst column shows business cycle statistics for Argentina from 1983
to 2001. The annual default probability of 3% is based on three default episodes in ap-
proximately one hundred years. The average debt over GDP ratio of 43.36% is calculated
for the period from 1983 to 2001 using Global Development Finance. The debt statistics
include total external debt of the private and public sectors. The second column of Table 1
presents the statistics in the model with decentralized borrowing. To highlight the role of
decentralized borrowing, we present these statistics in the model with centralized borrowing
under the same set of parameter values in the third column.
Table 1: Comparison of Decentralized and Centralized Borrowing
Statistics Data Model
Decentralized Centralized 1 Centralized 2
mean(spread) 10.31 10.20 0.49 10.21
std(spread) 5.60 19.91 0.82 7.12
mean(B=y)  43:36  16:57  14:80  4:94
std(y) 8.12 5.73 5.62 5.84
std(c) 9.47 6.53 6.20 6.49
std(TB=y) 1.75 1.44 1.28 1.94
corr(c, y) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.95
corr(TB, y)  0:59  0:45  0:35  0:16
corr(spread, y)  0:89  0:61  0:52  0:44
corr(spread, c)  0:91  0:72  0:64  0:58
corr(spread, TB=y) 0.70 0.84 0.81 0.57
prob(default) 3.00 3.01 0.04 3.07
drop in y upon default  14:21  14:01  16:88  9:76
drop in c upon default  16:01  13:63  16:59  9:61
welfare 9.81 9.93 9.94
discount factor  0.97 0.97 0.89
income loss  0.08 0.08 0.03
re-entry probability  0.10 0.10 0.25
Note: All statistics except correlations and welfare are in percentage terms. The income and consumption drops in
default are based on the 2001 default episode. The interest rate spread is computed as the dierence of the EMBI yield
and the yield of a 5 year U.S. bond.
thus compute the model statistics based on these 53 samples.
12There are three striking dierences between the decentralized and centralized borrowing
models. First, the mean spread under decentralized borrowing is higher by a factor of
more than twenty compared to that under centralized borrowing. Second, the model with
decentralized borrowing exhibits a much higher default probability, 3.01%, far exceeding
0.04% in the model with centralized borrowing. Third, the decentralized borrowing model
generates a higher debt to income ratio than the centralized borrowing model does. The mean
debt to income ratio is 16.57% in the decentralized borrowing model, while it is 14.80% in
the centralized borrowing model.
To understand these dierences, we examine borrowing decisions in the two models.
Figure 3 plots the desired borrowing conditional on not defaulting over the current bond
holdings.16 Desired borrowing is similar across the two models for low levels of debt. As
the debt level increases, desired borrowing increases faster under decentralized borrowing.
Under centralized borrowing, the government recognizes that the interest rate increases as
an additional unit of debt is taken. Under decentralized borrowing, however, households do
not take into account the interest rate eect of their borrowing and would like to overborrow.
This negative externality becomes especially severe when current debt is large and the interest
rate rises sharply with an additional unit of debt.
Figure 3: Comparison of Desired Borrowing















Borrowing and default are two instruments with which households aect their consump-
tion path. Under centralized borrowing, the government, or equivalently the representative
16All gures in this subsection are based on the income shock, which is 5% below the mean. We observe
the same qualitative results for the other income shocks. Both the current and next-period bond holdings
are normalized by the mean income shock.
13household, owns both instruments. Under decentralized borrowing, the households have
only the rst instrument and tend to take debt recklessly since they fail to internalize the
negative externality of their borrowing. Thus, welfare, especially the repayment welfare, is
lower under decentralized borrowing, as shown in Figure 4. Consequently, the government
nds default attractive for a wider range of debt levels under decentralized borrowing.
Figure 4: Comparison of Value Functions
















































The failure of individual households to internalize the eect of their borrowing on the
government's default choices lowers the bond price schedule under decentralized borrowing.
As shown in the left panel of Figure 5, the prices are discounted by more for any level
of bonds under decentralized borrowing. This less favorable bond price schedule generates
tighter debt limits and constrains borrowing by more. The right panel displays the total
resources that debt generates, q(B0;y)B0. Any debt B0 less than the safe debt limit B
0
generates resources B0=(1 + r). Once it exceeds the safe debt limit, the debt becomes risky.
Let us refer to the debt level which maximizes the resource obtained from foreign lenders,
q(B0;y)B0, as the risky debt limit, denoted by B
0. The optimal level of debt would never
exceed the risky debt limit because the borrower can obtain the same amount of resources
with a smaller next-period repayment. As shown in the gure, both the safe and risky debt
limits are tighter under decentralized borrowing.
The incentive to overborrow and the steeper bond price schedule have opposite eects
on the equilibrium level of debt. Whether decentralized borrowing leads to larger equilib-
rium debt depends on which force dominates. Under the benchmark calibration, desired
borrowing is higher even when the bond price schedule is less favorable under decentralized
borrowing. This leads to higher equilibrium debt under decentralized borrowing. Figure 6
14Figure 5: Comparison of Bond Price Schedules






















(a) Bond Price Schedule































(b) Total Resource Borrowed
shows the limiting distribution of bond holdings as shares of mean income for the two mod-
els. The distribution is more concentrated on high debt levels in the decentralized borrowing
model, while it is more dispersed in the centralized borrowing model. This implies that even
with higher costs of borrowing, the incentive to overborrow is strong enough to induce the
households to issue more debt. As a result, the interest rate spread is substantially higher
under decentralized borrowing. Also, the interest rate spread is more countercyclical under
decentralized borrowing. As shown in Table 1, corr(spread, y) and corr(spread, c) are  0:61
and  0:72, respectively, under decentralized borrowing, and  0:52 and  0:64, respectively,
under centralized borrowing.
Table 1 also reports the welfare statistics, measured as permanent consumption, for
each simulated model.17 The welfare is 1% lower under decentralized borrowing than under
centralized borrowing. The 1% welfare dierence is economically signicant, considering
that the welfare cost of business cycles estimated by Lucas (1987) is only about one-tenth
of a percent of consumption.18
In summary, the decentralized borrowing model generates a larger default rate, a higher
mean spread, lower welfare and larger equilibrium debt than the centralized borrowing model
in the benchmark calibration. All these ndings, except the one on equilibrium debt, are
robust to dierent default penalty parameters and specications. We will discuss these
robustness checks in the next section.
17The welfare calculation is based on the limiting distribution.
18More recently, Otrok (2001) also nds very small welfare costs of business cycles.
15Figure 6: Comparison of Bond Distributions























3.3 Quantitative Predictions of the Models
In this subsection, we compare the quantitative predictions of the two models with the
Argentine data. Both models are calibrated to match the relevant moments in the data. In
particular, the parameters , , and  are calibrated to best match the default rate, income
loss, and trade-balance volatility in the data. Unlike the model with decentralized borrowing,
the model with centralized borrowing has diculty in generating all three moments. To
generate a realistic default probability, it needs an unrealistically low discount factor of 0.89,
implying a quarterly interest rate as high as 12%. Under such a low discount factor, the
volatility of the trade balance is high and the income loss during default is small relative to
the data. The fourth column of Table 1 shows the statistics of the recalibrated model with
centralized borrowing.
The most striking dierence across these two models is the equilibrium debt level. The
debt to income ratio is less than 5% in the model with centralized borrowing. However, it is
about 17% in the model with decentralized borrowing|much closer to the data. The model
with centralized borrowing can generate larger equilibrium debt, but only at the expense of
substantially lowering equilibrium default rates. In contrast, the model with decentralized
borrowing has an inherent mechanism to produce both aspects jointly: households tend to
borrow more and the government tends to default more. Importantly, the decentralized
borrowing model brings the key moments closer to the data without resorting to unrealistic
discount factors.
16The model with decentralized borrowing also shows better performance in terms of repli-
cating countercyclical trade balances and interest rate spreads. The correlation between the
trade balance and income is  0:59 in the data; it is only  0:16 in the model with centralized
borrowing, but  0:45 in the model with decentralized borrowing. The correlation between
the interest rate spread and income is  0:89 in the data; it is only  0:44 in the model with
centralized borrowing, but  0:61 in the model with decentralized borrowing. Both mod-
els replicate well the mean interest rate spread, the income volatility and the consumption
volatility. In particular, consumption is more volatile than income. On the other hand, the
model with decentralized borrowing overestimates the volatility of the interest spread.
4 Overborrowing or Underborrowing
The calibrated model with decentralized borrowing generates a larger default rate, a higher
mean spread, lower welfare and larger equilibrium debt than the model with centralized bor-
rowing. This section examines whether these results are robust to dierent default penalty
parameters and to an alternative symmetric specication of the default penalty. We nd un-
der all variations that decentralized borrowing implies a larger default rate, a higher mean
spread, and lower welfare. The overborrowing result, however, is not robust: the decentral-
ized borrowing model might generate underborrowing as we vary the default penalties.
4.1 Alternative Default Penalty Parameters
Consider the two models with the benchmark parameter values. In the rst set of experi-
ments, we vary the default income loss parameter  from 1% to 20% while xing all the other
parameters. In the second set of experiments, we vary the re-entry probability from 1% to
40% while xing all the other parameters. We plot the equilibrium debt to income ratios
of the two models for these two sets of experiments in Figure 7. First of all, equilibrium
debt in both models increases with the default income loss  and decreases with the re-entry
probability . This is intuitive because larger values of  or lower values of  are associated
with more severe default penalties, and this in turn implies less frequent default and more
lenient bond price schedules.
Second, we nd that decentralized borrowing generates overborrowing for low values of
, but underborrowing for high values of , as shown in the left panel of Figure 7. The
dierences in equilibrium debt appear to be small in the gure, but the magnitudes of
overborrowing or underborrowing are not trivial. For example, decentralized borrowing
17Figure 7: Equilibrium Debt: Varying Default Penalties
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(b) Re-entry Probability 
generates overborrowing by 19.9% when  is 0.04 and underborrowing by 7.5% when  is
0.12. Note that for  higher than 0:18, no default happens and thus the equilibrium debt
levels are identical in both models.
As we discussed earlier, decentralized borrowing has two conicting eects on equilibrium
debt: the overborrowing and bond price schedule eects. The overborrowing incentive arises
from the failure of individual households to internalize the eect of their borrowing on the
bond price. This overborrowing eect is strong when the bond price schedule is steep, which
can be seen from comparing the rst order conditions in equation (9) and (10). On the
other hand, the bond price schedule eect arises from the failure of individual households
to internalize the eect of their borrowing on the government's default choices. This bond
price schedule eect is strong when the dierence between the bond price schedules in the
two models is large.
When  is low, the bond price schedules in both models are steep and the dierence
between them is small, as shown in the left panel of Figure 8. This implies a strong overbor-
rowing eect and a weak bond price schedule eect. As  increases, the bond price schedules
in both models become atter and the dierence between them becomes larger, as shown in
the right panel of Figure 8. This implies that the overborrowing eect weakens and the bond
price schedule eect strengthens. Therefore, the overborrowing eect tends to dominate for
low , but the bond price schedule eect tends to dominate for high .
Finally, we compare equilibrium debt of the two models for dierent re-entry probabilities
. Decentralized borrowing generates overborrowing when  is high, but underborrowing
18Figure 8: Bond Prices for Dierent Income Losses
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(b) High Income Loss ( = 0:14)
when  is low. In particular, equilibrium debt under decentralized borrowing is 47.5% more
when  is 0.3, but 14.5% less when  is 0.07. The equilibrium debt levels are identical
across the two models for very low values of , which implies no default in equilibrium. The
intuition for these results is similar to that for dierent . When  is high, the bond price
schedules are steep and similar in both models, which leads to equilibrium overborrowing.
When  is low, the bond price schedules become atter and the dierence between them
becomes larger, implying equilibrium underborrowing.
When the default rates are zero in both models, the two models generate identical business
cycle statistics including the mean spread, default rate and welfare. In all the other cases, the
model with decentralized borrowing generates larger default rates, higher mean spreads, and
lower welfare than the model with centralized borrowing. Even when decentralized borrowing
generates equilibrium underborrowing, the substantial dierence in the bond price schedule,
as shown in the right panel of gure 8, is enough to make the spreads higher in equilibrium.
We report the detailed statistics for these experiments in Appendix B.
4.2 Alternative Default Penalty Specication
We now investigate the symmetric default penalty of the following form:
y
def = (1   )y; for all y; (12)
19where  captures the constant fraction of income loss after default. Figure 9 shows equilib-
rium debt levels for dierent values of  and . Surprisingly, under the symmetric default
penalty, decentralized borrowing consistently generates underborrowing.
Figure 9: Equilibrium Debt under Symmetric Default Penalty




















(a) Default Income Loss 











(b) Re-entry Probability 
To understand this result, we plot the bond price schedules for both models under the
symmetric default penalty in the left panel of Figure 10. In the right panel, we plot the
resources obtained from foreign lenders, q(B0;y)B0, as a function of next-period debt. The
bond price schedules are extremely steep and the risky-debt region [B
0;B
0
] is tiny in both
models. For the overborrowing eect to operate, the risky debt region needs to be large to
accommodate the overborrowing incentives. Given the tiny risky debt region, equilibrium
debt is mainly constrained by the safe debt limits in both models. Under decentralized bor-
rowing, the overborrowing incentives tighten the safe debt limit greatly, and this translates
into underborrowing in equilibrium.
As in the case with the asymmetric default penalty, the model with decentralized bor-
rowing generates a higher default probability, a higher mean spread, and lower welfare for
all the cases with positive default rates. We report the detailed statistics for dierent values
of parameters in the symmetric default penalty case in Appendix B.
Our analysis shows that private borrowing does not necessarily lead to overborrowing
when the lending practice is based on aggregate credit conditions. The shift from sovereign
to private borrowing, however, unambiguously reduces welfare of domestic households and
increases the likelihood of debt crisis. Therefore, regulations on private international borrow-
ing are welfare improving. The most obvious policy would be to prohibit private borrowing.
20Figure 10: Bond Prices Under Symmetric Default Penalty






















(a) Bond Price Schedule
































(b) Total Resource Borrowed
This would require that the government be able to eciently allocate funds among house-
holds. Alternatively, the government can impose, on international private borrowing, either
taxes if there is overborrowing in equilibrium or subsidies if there is underborrowing in equi-
librium.19 Future research on the optimal tax or subsidy on international private borrowing
will be useful since in practice it is hard to implement capital controls.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a quantitative model of a small open economy with decentralized
borrowing and centralized default. In the model, individual households make borrowing
decisions and a government makes default decisions to maximize the welfare of the represen-
tative household. Accordingly, foreign lenders price debt contracts based on macroeconomic
variables: aggregate income shocks and aggregate debt levels. Private agents do not inter-
nalize the negative externality of their borrowing on aggregate credit costs, and thus have
incentives to overborrow. As a result, decentralized borrowing drives up the economy-wide
credit costs, raises the likelihood of sovereign default, and lowers welfare.
Despite the overborrowing incentives, the model with decentralized borrowing does not
necessarily lead to a higher level of equilibrium debt than the model with centralized bor-
rowing. This is because households also face a less favorable bond price schedule under
19For discussions of optimal policy under complete markets, see Jeske (2006), Kehoe and Perri (2004) and
Wright (2006).
21decentralized borrowing, which tends to reduce the optimal level of debt. When the in-
come loss after default is disproportionately large under good income shocks, decentralized
borrowing generates overborrowing in equilibrium for lenient default penalties, but under-
borrowing for severe default penalties. When the income loss is proportional to the income
shock, decentralized borrowing always generates a lower equilibrium debt level for a wide
range of default penalties.
The introduction of decentralized borrowing improves the quantitative t of the model
to the data. The standard sovereign debt models with centralized borrowing have dicul-
ties in simultaneously generating a reasonable default rate and equilibrium debt level. In
contrast, the model with decentralized borrowing has an inherent mechanism to improve
the performance on both statistics jointly: the households tend to borrow more and the
government tends to default more. Importantly, the decentralized borrowing model brings
the key moments closer to the data without resorting to unrealistic discount factors.
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24Appendix A { Computational Algorithm
In this appendix, we describe the computation algorithm for each model. We start with
the model with decentralized borrowing. We rst discretize the state space (b;y;B0). We
next make initial guesses for the bond price schedule and the government default decision.
Specically, we assume that q0(B0;y) = 1
1+r for all (B0;y) and d0(B;y) = 0 for all (B;y).
Given these guesses, we solve the individual household's optimal debt level b0(b;y;B0), to-
gether with the law of motion of aggregate debt B0 =  (B;y). Specically, we accomplish
this using the following steps.
We guess an initial law of motion of aggregate debt  0(B;y). We then solve for the
optimal value functions vR and vD and the optimal debt policy b0 using value function
iteration. We then smooth the continuation value in equation (3) over B0 by taking moving
averages to minimize the spurious non-monotonicity in the optimal choices b0 over B0 due to
discrete space methods. We update the law of motion of aggregate debt  1(B;y) such that
b0(b;y;B0) = B0. We iterate these procedures until  (B;y) converges. If there exist more
than one xed point, we take the B0 that gives the smallest debt.
We now update the default decision d1(B;y) by solving the government's problem in
equation (1). Accordingly, we update the bond price schedule. In order to minimize spurious
movements in the bond price, we interpolate the bond price schedule. To do so, we rst
interpolate the value functions vR and vD over the income shock y. We next nd an income
level ^ y(B) at which vR(B; ^ y(B);B0) = vD(^ y(B)) for each B. Note that ^ y(B) is not restricted
to the discrete shock levels. We then update q1(B0;y) = (1  
R ^ y(B)
 1 f(y0jy)dy0)=(1 + r). We
iterate over the bond price schedule until it converges.
The computation algorithm for the model with centralized borrowing is simpler. We dis-
cretize the state space (B;y). We start with a guess for the bond price schedule, q0
C(B0;y) =
1
1+r for all (B0;y). We next solve the optimal value functions W R, W D and the optimal
policy function B0 using value function iteration. We then update the default decision based
on W R and W D. We nally update the bond price schedule using a smoothing method
analogous to that described above. We repeat the above procedures until the bond price
schedule converges.
To see the eect of the bond price interpolation, Figure 11 shows the bond price schedule
before and after the interpolation for the model with centralized borrowing. The discrete
state-space (DSS) technique causes discrete jumps in the bond price, while our interpolation
method removes spurious movements in the bond price. Simulation results show that the
25interpolation greatly reduces the volatility and countercyclicality of the interest rate spread.
Also, it reduces the default rate substantially, which suggests that the DSS method might
overestimate the default likelihood.
Figure 11: Bond Price Schedule with and without Interpolation






















Note: The displayed bond price schedule is for an income shock 10% below the mean.
The bond price schedules for other income shocks look similar.
Appendix B { Sensitivity Analysis
In this appendix, we report the simulation results for dierent default penalties. Table 2
presents the relevant statistics for the two models under the asymmetric default penalty
specication for dierent values of default penalty parameters. The results can be summa-
rized as follows. First, the decentralized borrowing model generates overborrowing when
default penalties are lenient (corresponding to low  and high ), and underborrowing when
default penalties are severe (corresponding to high  and low ). Second, under all default
penalty parameter values, the model with decentralized borrowing generates substantially
higher mean spreads, larger default rates and lower welfare than the model with centralized
borrowing.
26Table 2: Varying Default Penalties: Asymmetric Income Loss
 
0.04 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.2 0.3
Decentralized
mean(B=y) -8.44 -11.69 -25.13 -30.42 -20.79 -10.94 -8.44 -5.43
mean(spread) 12.04 10.35 9.79 9.29 10.15 10.40 11.53 14.06
prob(default) 3.88 3.30 2.62 2.13 2.93 3.49 4.23 5.13
welfare 9.73 9.73 9.83 9.72 9.77 9.74 9.73 9.75
Centralized
mean(B=y) -7.04 -10.44 -27.01 -32.41 -23.80 -8.88 -6.15 -3.68
mean(spread) 0.44 0.43 0.29 0.05 0.28 0.68 0.84 1.31
prob(default) 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.37
welfare 9.94 9.93 9.89 9.83 9.91 9.92 9.92 9.93
Table 3 shows the simulation results for the symmetric default penalty specication.
Unlike the asymmetric default penalty, independent of the default penalty parameter values,
the decentralized borrowing model consistently generates lower equilibrium debt, higher
mean spreads, higher default rates, and lower welfare.
Table 3: Varying Default Penalties: Symmetric Income Loss
 
0.005 0.015 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.35
Decentralized
mean(B=y) -3.01 -8.99 -11.41 -16.68 -16.75 -11.41 -8.68 -4.01
mean(spread) 2.33 1.97 1.20 0.99 1.34 1.20 1.12 0.83
prob(default) 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00
welfare 9.84 9.84 9.82 9.78 9.82 9.82 9.76 9.83
Centralized
mean(B=y) -3.98 -12.55 -16.99 -26.18 -30.28 -16.99 -11.76 -5.18
mean(spread) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
prob(default) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
welfare 9.96 9.94 9.93 9.91 9.92 9.93 9.95 9.99
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